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Abstract We critically analyse the point of view for which laws of nature
are just a mean to compress data. Discussing some basic notions of dynamical
systems and information theory, we show that the idea that the analysis of
large amount of data by means of an algorithm of compression is equivalent to
the knowledge one can have from scientific laws, is rather naive. In particular
we discuss the subtle conceptual topic of the initial conditions of phenomena
which are generally incompressible. Starting from this point, we argue that
laws of nature represent more than a pure compression of data, and that the
availability of large amount of data, in general, is not particularly useful to
understand the behaviour of complex phenomena.
1 Introduction
It is not necessary to stress too much the fact that the external world is not just
a jungle of irregular events. There is a quite clear evidence of our ability to un-
derstand (at least partially) the many regularities of our physical world. Then,
it is quite natural to ponder about the origin of such a success. A very general
question is: why is the physical world comprehensible? In particular one can
wonder about the existence and the status of mathematical laws which allow
us quantitative or qualitative predictions in agreement with experiments[1,2].
In the past some scientists (and philosophers) stated that the aim of science
is to organise in the most economical fashion the data collected from experi-
ments. In this view, laws are just a very effective way to compress disparate
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data. Likely the most important champion of such a view of the science has
been E.Mach[3,4]:
The so-called descriptive sciences must chiefly remain content with recon-
structing individual facts . . . But in sciences that are more highly developed,
rules for the reconstruction of great numbers of facts may be embodied in a
single expression.
Thus, instead of noting individual cases of light-refraction, we can men-
tally reconstruct all present and future cases, if we know that the incident
ray, the refracted ray, and the perpendicular lie in the same plane and that
sinα/ sinβ = n. Here, instead of the numberless cases of refraction in dif-
ferent combinations of matter and under all different angles of incidence, we
have simply to note the rule above stated and the values of n, which is much
easier. The economical purpose is here unmistakable.
This point of view has been shared by many scientists of the positivism
or neopositivism currents. Interestingly, such an approach has been recently
reconsidered in the framework of algorithmic complexity [5] by researchers
without specific philosophical interests. For instance, Solomonoff, one of the
fathers of the theory, considers (without any reference to Mach) a scientific
law, and more generally a theory, as an algorithm for compressing the results
of experiments, providing a mathematical formalisation of the idea of science
as an economy of thought [6]:
The laws of science that have been discovered can be viewed as summaries of
large amounts of empirical data about the universe. In the present context, each
such law can be transformed into a method of compactly coding the empirical
data that gave rise to the law.
We can cite other similar opinions, e.g.
The existence of regularities may be expressed by saying that the world is al-
gorithmically compressible. Given some data set, the job of the scientist is to
find a suitable compression, which expresses the causal linkages involved. For
example, the positions of the planets in the solar system over some interval
constitute a compressible data set, because Newton’s laws may be used to link
these positions at all times to the positions (and velocities) at some initial
time. In this case Newtons laws supply the necessary algorithm to achieve the
compression. [7].
The intelligibility of the world amounts to the fact that we find it to be algorith-
mically compressible. We can replace sequences of facts and observational data
by abbreviated statements which contain the same information content. These
abbreviations we often call laws of Nature. If the world were not algorithmically
compressible, then there would exist no simple laws of Nature.[8].
As an interesting exception to the idea of science as economy of thought,
we may recall Born [9] who ironically noted:
if we want to economise thinking, the best way would be to stop thinking
at all, and then the expression economy of thinking may have an appeal to
engineers or others interested in practical applications, but hardly to those
who enjoy thinking for no other purpose than clarify a problem.
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In our opinion the idea of economy of thought removes all objectivity to the
scientific laws and mathematical constructions. For reasons which we do not
discuss here, this approach has gained much interest and broad success in the
last decades under the vaguely-defined concept of complexity. The word “com-
plexity” has become rather a “logo” for mainstream analysis; like in the 30’s to
be “modern” was mandatory, to be “complex” seems required to be fashion-
able today [10]. While we can agree that the arising of nonlinear physics and
mathematics since the pioneering works of Poincare´ has represented a major
change in science, perhaps even a change of paradigm, the recent insistence on
the “complex” often appears preposterous [11]. Loosely speaking, complexity
studies share the idea to apply the same tools, mainly from dynamical sys-
tems and statistical mechanics, to a very large spectrum of phenomena, from
social and human sciences to astrophysics, regardless of the specific content
of each problem. Therefore it is implicitly assumed that the laws underlying
these phenomena are not important. More recently, this point of view has be-
come extremely radical with the ”big data” philosophy, which presents many
conceptual and technical problems [11–13]. In that framework, laws should be
supplanted by the statistical analysis of a large amount of data, again care-
lessly of any specificity. In this sense, science becomes a technical compression
of data.
The point of view of science as economy of thought seems to be in agree-
ment with the idea that the central goal of science has been thought to be
”prediction and control”. As a relevant example of this opinion we can men-
tion the von Neumann’s belief that powerful computers and a clever use of
numerical analysis would eventually lead to accurate forecasts, and even to
the control of weather and climate:
The computer will enable us to divide the atmosphere at any moment into
stable regions and unstable regions. Stable regions we can predict. Unstable
regions we can control.1
We know now that the great von Neumann was wrong: he did not take into
account the role of chaos. About half a century ago, thanks to the contribution
of M.He´non, E.Lorenz and B.V.Chirikov (to cite just some of the most eminent
scientists in this field), we had the (re)discovery of deterministic chaos. This
event was scientifically important, e.g. to clarify topics as the different possible
origin of the statistical laws and the intrinsic practical limits of predictions. Yet
one has to admit that the topic of ”chaos” induced a certain confusion about
concepts as determinism, predictability, stochastic laws and the understanding
of a phenomenon in terms of compression; for instance, Davies [14] writes
there is a wide class of physical systems, the so-called chaotic ones, which
are not algorithmically compressible.
We will see that what is not compressible is the time sequence generated by
chaotic systems, and this is due to the non-compressibility of a generic initial
condition.
The aim of the present paper is to clarify the real relevance of the ideas as
1 Cited by Dyson[14].
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”compression” and algorithmic complexity in science, in particular in physics.
For such an aim, a detailed analysis of of laws, initial conditions and data is
necessary.
Section 2 is devoted to a general discussion on evolution laws, initial condi-
tions and data. In Section 3 we treat in details the role of the initial conditions
and the compressibility. The question of the relation between compression and
laws of natures is discussed in Section 4. In order to clarify the role of the al-
gorithmic complexity in the research, two case studies are presented in Section
5. Some final remarks and considerations in Section 6.
2 About the laws and data
The aim of this Section is to clarify the distinction between phenomena, evolu-
tion laws, initial conditions, and series of data; the level of the discussion will
not be technical, the precise notion of complexity will be discussed in Section
3 and in the Appendix.
Natural phenomena, roughly speaking, can be divided in two large classes:
(a1) simple, e.g. stable and predictable, an example is the pendulum;
(a2) complex, i.e. irregular and unpredictable, a paradigmatic example is tur-
bulence in fluids.
The evolution laws can be:
(b1) known;
(b2) unknown.
The initial conditions can be:
(c1) simple;
(c2) complex.
Finally, the series of data generated by a certain phenomenon appear:
(d1) regular;
(d2) irregular.
2.1 The simplest case: the law is known
First, let us consider the case b1, which is, from a methodological point of
view, the simplest one. The possibilities are the following:
a1 + c1 (S.1)
a1 + c2 (S.2)
a2 + c1 (C.1)
a2 + c2 (C.2)
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The cases S.1 and S.2 are quite clear: independently from initial conditions,
the system will display a regular behaviour, thus
a1 + c1 → d1, and a1 + c2 → d1 .
The case C.1 is not typical (i.e. rather rare); on the contrary the case C.2
must be considered generic, i.e. considering a large ensemble of natural phe-
nomena, almost all of them will join this class. In turn, “almost all” indicates
that the probability to find one behaving differently will be basically zero if we
consider a large enough ensemble. Indeed the situation C.1 can be observed
only under particular circumstances, most of natural phenomena are part of
the category C.2. Why initial conditions are almost always complex will be
explained in Section 3.
Considering now the case C.2, since the evolution law of the system is
known, the irregularity in the outcome of the dynamics has to be necessarily
hidden in the initial conditions. To better clarify this point, one can consider
that any initial condition x0 can be written, in a unique way, in terms of a
binary sequence {i1, i2, ...}. Such a sequence can be
? compressible (for instance periodic, or periodic after a certain initial part),
corresponding to rational x0; in such a case the dynamics generates a reg-
ular sequence, as in the C.1 case:
a2 + c1 → d1 .
? incompressible (e.g. aperiodic), in such a case the dynamics generates an
irregular sequence, as in the C.2 case:
a2 + c2 → d2 .
2.2 The evolution law is not known
Of course only in few lucky situations (mainly in physics) we know the laws
ruling a certain phenomena with a good precision. In ecology, biology and
many other applied sciences, it is not possible to write down the equations
describing a certain phenomenon on the basis of well established theoretical
frameworks and it is unavoidable to use a combination of intuition and exper-
imental data [15,16].
Often the importance of the concept of state of the system, i.e. in mathe-
matical terms, the variables which describe the phenomenon under investiga-
tion is not enough stressed. The relevance of this aspect is usually underesti-
mated; only in few cases, e.g. in mechanical systems, it is easy to identify the
variables which describe a given phenomenon. On the contrary, in a generic
case, there are serious difficulties; we can say that the main effort in building a
theory on nontrivial phenomena concerns the identification of the appropriate
variables. Such a difficulty is well known in physics, for instance in the context
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of statistical mechanics Onsager and Machlup, in their seminal work on fluc-
tuations and irreversible processes [17], stressed the problem with the caveat:
how do you know you have taken enough variables, for it to be Markovian? 2
In a similar way, Ma notes that[18]: the hidden worry of thermodynamics
is: we do not know how many coordinates or forces are necessary to completely
specify an equilibrium state.
Usually we have no definitive method for selecting the proper variables and
only a deep theoretical understanding can suggest the “good ones”.
Takens [19] showed that from the study of a time series {u1, u2, ..., uM},
where u is an observable, it is possible (if we know that the system is deter-
ministic and is described by a finite dimensional vector) to determine a proper
set of variables fully describing the system . Unfortunately, in practice, the
method has rather severe limitations:
(a) it works only if we know a priori that the system is deterministic;
(b) because of the finite size M of the time series, in practice the protocol
fails if the dimension of the attractor is large enough (say more than 5 or
6).
Therefore this method cannot be used, apart from special cases (with a small
dimension), to build a model for the evolution law from data[20].
We will discuss in some details the difficulties of the method in Section 5.2.
3 Evolution laws and initial conditions
Let us now consider a topic which should be carefully analyzed: the role of
initial conditions, which are usually independent of the laws of nature. Such
an important point had been already realised by Newton[21] who noted that
all the planets move in the same direction on concentric orbits, while the
comets move in eccentric orbits, concluding that such a property of the solar
system cannot be a mere coincidence, but it is due to the initial condition.
Wigner considers the understanding of the distinction between laws and initial
conditions as the most important contribution that Newton made to science,
even more important than the laws of gravitation and dynamics[22].
2 As paradigmatic example let us consider the Langevin equation
d2x
dt2
+ γ
dx
dt
= −ω2x+ cη
where η is a white noise, i.e. a Gaussian stochastic process with 〈η〉 = 0 and 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 =
δ(t − t′), and γ > 0. It is worth emphasising that the vector y = (x, dx/dt) is a Markov
process, i.e. its stochastic evolution at t > 0 is determined only by y(0), on the contrary
the scalar variable x is not a Markovian process, and thus its dynamics depends on its past
history.
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3.1 Two examples of deterministic systems
Let us analyse the very different behaviour of two deterministic systems; we
will see how the initial conditions can play a basic role.
Example A The pendulum of length L:
d2θ
dt2
= − g
L
sin θ . (1)
From well known mathematical theorems on differential equations we know
that:
a) the initial condition (θ(0), dθ(0)/dt) determines in a unique way the state
of the system (θ(t), dθ(t)/dt) at any time t;
b) the motion is periodic, i.e. there exists a time T (depending on the physical
parameters) such that(
θ(t+ T ),
dθ(t+ T )
dt
)
=
(
θ(t),
dθ(t)
dt
)
;
c) the time evolution can be expressed in terms of a function of t and the
initial conditions:
θ(t) = F
(
t, θ(0),
dθ(0)
dt
)
.
The function F can be written in an explicitly way if θ(0) and dθ(0)/dt are
small, in such case T = 2pi
√
L/g:
θ(t) = θ(0) cos(ωt) +
1
ω
dθ(0)
dt
sin(ωt)
dθ(t)
dt
= −θ(0)ω sin(ωt) + dθ(0)
dt
cos(ωt)
where ω = 2pi/T . In the generic case, F can be easily determined with the
wished precision by numerical resolution.
Example B The Bernoulli’s shift:
xt+1 = 2xt mod 1 . (2)
Where the operation mod 1 corresponds to take the fractional part of a num-
ber, e.g. 1.473 mod 1 = 0.473.
It is possible to show that the Bernoulli’s shift is chaotic: a small error in
the initial conditions doubles at every step. Consider an initial condition x0 in
the interval [0, 1], it can be expressed by an infinite sequence of 0 and 1:
x0 =
a1
2
+
a2
4
+ ...+
an
2n
+ ... (3)
where every an takes either the value 0 or the value 1. The above binary
notation allows us to determine the time evolution by means of a very simple
rule: at every step, one has just to move the ”binary point” of the binary
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expansion of x0 by one position to the right and eliminate the integer part.
For example, from
x0 = 0.11010000101110101010101100.....
one has
x1 = 0.1010000101110101010101100.......
x2 = 0.010000101110101010101100.........
x3 = 0.10000101110101010101100...........
and so on. In terms of the sequence{a1, a2, ....} it becomes quite clear how
crucially the temporal evolution depends on the initial condition. If the binary
sequence associated to x0 is not complex, e.g. x0 is a rational number, then
the sequence {x0, x1, ...} will be regular; on the contrary if the binary sequence
associated to x0 is complex, the sequence {x0, x1, ...} will remain complex.
Let us consider two initial conditions x
(1)
0 and x
(2)
0 such that |x(1)0 −x(2)0 | <
2−M for some arbitrary (large) integer number M , this means that x(1)0 and
x
(2)
0 have the first M binary digits identical, and they may differ only af-
terwards. The above discussion shows that the distance between the points
increases rapidly: for t < M one has an exponential growth of the distance
between the two trajectories
|x(1)t − x(2)t | ∼ |x(1)0 − x(2)0 | 2t , (4)
As soon as t > M one can only conclude that |x(1)t −x(2)t | < 1. We can say that
our system is chaotic: even an arbitrarily small error in the initial conditions
eventually dominates the solution of the system, making long-term prediction
impossible.
From the above brief discussion, we see how in deterministic systems one
can have the following possible cases (in decreasing order of predictability):
1. Explicit possibility to determine the future (pendulum in the limit of small
oscillations);
2. Good control of the prediction, without an explicit solution (the pendulum
with large oscillations);
3. Chaos and practical impossibility of predictability (Bernoulli’s shift).
3.2 About initial conditions and compression
Let us consider again the dynamical system (2), which is chaotic, i.e. the
distance between two trajectories initially very close, increases exponentially
in time:
δt = |x(1)t − x(2)t | ∼ δ0 eλt , (5)
where λ, called Lyapunov exponent, is positive. In the system (2), λ = ln 2,
this means that a small error in the initial conditions doubles at every step.
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Suppose that x0 is a real number in the interval [0, 1], it can be expressed by
an infinite sequence of 0 and 1 as in (3). We already saw that looking at the
sequence {a1, a2, ...., an, ...}, it becomes quite clear how crucially the temporal
evolution depends on the initial condition.
Let us now make a brief digression on the notion of ”complexity” of a
binary sequence. Generally speaking, different types of sequences are possible,
for example consider the following ones:
11111111111111... (6)
10101010101010... (7)
00101000110100... (8)
It is quite natural to say that sequences (6) and (7) appear to be ”ordered”,
whereas sequence (8) seems ”complex”. Why should one classify the sequences
in this way? In the case of (6) and (7) the knowledge of the first n values
{a1, ..., an} appears to be sufficient to predict the following values {an+1, an+2, ...}.
This is not true for sequence (8), which seems to be generated by a stochastic,
rather than deterministic rule. In this case, one could think that the sequence
of 0 and 1 is generated tossing a coin, and writing 1 for heads and 0 for tails.
One way to formalise this intuitive concept of complex behaviour is to asso-
ciate it with the lack of a constructive rule; then the cases (6) and (7) are not
complex because they can be generated by means of very simple rules. On a
computer, for instance, (6) can be generated through a single statement:
WRITE 1 N TIMES
and similarly for (7):
WRITE 10 N/2 TIMES
By contrast, (8) seems to require a program of the kind:
WRITE 0 WRITE 0 WRITE 1 WRITE 0 ......
We can conclude that the sequences (6) and (7) can be considered “simple”
because they can be obtained with a short computer code; on the contrary the
length of computer code which generates (8) is proportional to the size of the
sequence.
The rationalization of the above remarks needs the introduction of a precise
mathematical formalisation of the algorithmic complexity of a sequence[23–25],
a brief introduction is given in the Appendix.
4 Do scientific laws compress empirical data?
Surely it is fair to say that once a scientific law has been established one has a
sort of compression, however such a conclusion deserves a careful analysis. In
order to clarify such a topic we briefly discuss two examples of scientific laws,
namely the Newton’s equations for the classical mechanics and the Schro¨dinger
equation.
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4.1 Classical mechanics and astronomy
It is well know that from Newton’s equations and the gravitation law, one can
derive many important astronomical facts, for instance Kepler’s laws.
On the other hand it is not completely correct to conclude that Newton’s
equations and the gravitation law are able to compress all the astronomical
behaviors. After the seminal contribution of Poincare´, we know that a system
of three bodies interacting with the gravitational force is usually chaotic [11].
Such a celebrated system is an example of the case (C.2).
In the following we will show how the presence of chaos implies the failure
of the possibility to compress astronomical evolution. For sake of simplicity,
instead of discussing such a difficult problem, we reconsider the system (2)
which shares many features with the three body problem.
Let us analyse the problem of transmission to a friend, with accuracy ∆,
of a sequence xt 0 < t < T , generated by the rule (2). At first glance, the
problem seems quite simple: we could opt for transmitting x0 and the rule
(2), which costs a number of bits independent of T . Our friend would then be
left with the task of generating the sequence x1, x2, ..., xT . However, we must
also choose the number of bits to which x0 should be specified. From (3), the
accuracy ∆ at time T requires accuracy δ0 ∼ 2−T∆ for x0, hence the number
of bits specifying x0 grows with T . Again, we have to tackle the problem of
the complexity of a sequence of symbols, {a0, a1, ...}. The fact is that there are
”simple” initial conditions, of the type (6) or (7), which can be specified by a
number of instructions independent of the length of the sequence, but there
are complex sequences as well.
We saw that the evolution law of (2) is nothing but a shift of the binary
point of the sequence {a1, a2, ..., }. Therefore we have that the evolution of x0
is regular (e.g. periodic) if its sequence {a1, a2, ..., } is not complex while it is
irregular if {a1, a2, ..., } cannot be compressed.
So we have that both in systems with regular behavior (the pendulum) and
chaos (the Bernoulli’s shift), it is straightforward to compress the evolution
law. The difference between the two systems is in the output which is always
regular in the pendulum, whereas in the Bernoulli’s shift it can be regular or
irregular depending on the initial condition.
The conclusion, somehow rather intuitive, is that in deterministic systems
the details of the time evolution are well hidden in the initial condition which
turns out to be typically complex. The complexity of initial conditions follows
from an important mathematical result of Martin-Lo¨f [26] who showed that
almost all infinite binary sequences, which express the real numbers in [0, 1],
are complex. We do not enter into details of such a topic which involves rather
subtle points related to the infinity and the Go¨del theorem [27].
Coming back to astronomy, from the previous result we can conclude that,
in presence of chaos, the knowledge of the basic laws ruling the time evolution
of the astronomical bodies (i.e. Newton’s laws and the gravitational force) is
not enough to compress the complex time behaviour which is hidden in the
(almost surely) complex initial condition.
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4.2 Quantum mechanics and chemistry
Consider now the Schro¨dinger equation and its relation with chemistry; P.A.M.
Dirac wrote the following celebrated sentence [28]:
The fundamental laws necessary for the mathematical treatment of a large
part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known, and the
difficulty lies only in the fact that application of these laws leads to equations
that are too complex to be solved.
We are able to find the explicit solution of the Schro¨dinger equation for
the hydrogen atom, and such a result has been the starting point to explain
with high accuracy the phenomena observed in experimental spectroscopy. So
at first glance it seems fair to say that the Schro¨dinger equation is able to
compress the spectroscopic data.
On the other hand the relation between quantum mechanics and chemistry
is rather controversial, and surely much weaker than the link between Newto-
nian mechanics and astronomy. For instance, in the latter case the theory was
able to predict the existence of a previously unknown planet (Neptune). On
the contrary, as far as we know, there is nothing similar in chemistry regarding
the prediction of a new element solely on the basis of quantum mechanics.
Let us briefly discuss an issue which allows us to understand the severe
limitation of the predictive power of quantum mechanics [15,29,30]. Consider
the pyramidal molecules, e.g. ammonia (NH3), phosphine (PN3) or arsine
(AsH3). The three isolated molecules are described by the same Hamiltonian
with the unique numerical difference of a parameter (namely the masses of
the different chemical species N , P and As). From an analysis of the quantum
problem of the isolated molecule one obtains that the pyramidal molecules are
delocalised, in clear disagreement with experiments which show that arsine
is localised [29,31]. The localization does not follow in a straightforward way
from quantum mechanics but is a consequence of the interaction of single
molecules with an external environment consisting of a very large number of
components. The emergence of molecular structures can be understood only
considering the interaction with an environment containing a large number of
microscopic constituents [29,31]. In this case, we could say that it is not fair
to speak of compression because of the (very) complex boundary conditions
to be supplied to Schro¨dinger equations.
5 About the role of algorithmic complexity: two case study
In order to clarify the role of chaos, initial conditions and algorithmic complex-
ity in real scientific activity we discuss in some details two important topics.
Namely we consider the features of fully developed turbulence (FDT)[32], and
how to reconstruct the evolution law from time series in the cases it is not
possible to use some well established theory.
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5.1 Turbulence
Turbulent flows, a paradigmatic case of complex system, are governed by the
Navier-Stokes equations (NSE) which can be written in one line. In the in-
compressible case one has:
∂tu + (u · ∇)u = −1
ρ
∇p+ ν∆u + f , ∇ · u = 0 ,
where u is the velocity field, ρ the (constant) density, p the pressure, ν the
kinematic viscosity and f an external force [32,33].
So, naively, one could conclude that, since we know the equation for the
time evolution of the velocity field, somehow, the phenomenon of turbulence
has been compressed, as well as most of fluid mechanics. The study of some
specific aspects allows for the understanding of the precise meaning and lim-
itation of such a conclusion. First, let us consider the problem of the initial
conditions: of course in any experiment they are necessarily known with a lim-
ited precision. A rather severe limitation is due to the fact that in the limit of
very large Reynolds numbers Re
3, for a proper description of the turbulent
velocity field it is necessary to consider a huge number of degrees of freedom:
a rough estimate is N ∼ R9/4e [32,33]. Therefore for the typical values of Re
in FDT (∼ 106 − 109), because of the gigantic amount of data necessary to
describe the involved degrees of freedom, we have an obvious impossibility to
access to the initial conditions with the proper accuracy.
In addition at large Re the NSE are chaotic: the distance between two
initially close initial conditions increases very fast. Therefore, as a consequence
of the practical impossibility to access the initial conditions with high accuracy,
and the presence of deterministic chaos, even with a very powerful computer
and accurate numerical algorithms, it is not possible to perform a simulation
of the NSE for a long term and compare the single-trajectory prediction with
experimental results.
Because of the practical impossibility to compare the experimental results
with the numerical computation of the field u(x, t), we cannot say that the
NSE are able to compress the turbulent behaviors. Nevertheless there is a
general consensus on the validity of the NSE for the FDT.
We can mention at least four items supporting the opinion that NSE are
able to describe FDT, the agreement of the results observed in FDT and those
obtained by the NSE for:
(a) short time prediction of the velocity field;
(b) long time prediction of averaged (e.g. spatially caorse grained) quantities;
3 The Reynolds number
Re =
UL
ν
,
being U and L the typical velocity and length of the flow respectively, indicates the relevance
of the non linear terms. At small Re we have a laminar flow, while the regime Re  1 is
called fully developed turbulence.
Compressibility, laws of nature, initial conditions and complexity 13
(c) the scaling laws, and more generally, the statistical features;
(d) the qualitative and quantitative spatio-temporal features (e.g. large scale
coherent structures).
A general discussion can be found in the literature [32,33].
5.2 When the evolution law is not known
Let us note that the NSE have been derived on a theoretical basis using the
Newton equations, assuming the hypothesis of the continuity of matter, and
some thermodynamic considerations. One can wonder about the possibility to
obtain the NSE just looking directly at experimental data.
Since in the NSE one deals with fields (i.e. infinite dimensional quantities),
it is natural to expect formidable difficulties. A less ambitious (but conceptual
similar) task is to build models in finite dimension on the basis of experimental
data [34]. Only for the sake of simplicity we assume the most favorable case,
i.e. the time is discrete, the system is deterministic and we know that the state
of the system at time k is a finite dimensional vector xk.
Consider the problem of the prediction from the available data, i.e. a long
time sequence. A quite natural approach is to search for a past state similar
to the present state of a given phenomenon of interest, then, looking at the
sequence of events that followed the past state, one may infer by analogy the
evolution that will follow the present state. In more precise terms, given a
known sequence of ”analogues”, i.e. of past states x1, ...,xM which resemble
each other closely in pairs, so that |xk −xM | <  with  reasonably small, one
makes the approximate prediction:
xM+1 = xk+1
if xk is an analogue of xM [11].
In the case the above protocol can be used, one may then proceed to build
a model of the phenomenon, i.e. to determine a function f(x) such that the
sequence of states is well approximated by the dynamical system
xk+1 = f(xk) . (9)
The application of this method requires knowledge of at least one analogue. It
is possible to state4 that such knowledge requires sufficiently long sequences,
at least of duration of order TR ∼ (L/)D, where L is the typical length scale
of the system, and D is the dimension of the attractor5.
The exponential growth of TR as a function of D has a severe impact on our
ability to make predictions, and the building of a model for the evolution law
(9), solely relying on previously acquired data. One can say that D larger than
4 This is the essence of Kac’s lemma, a well know result of ergodic theory [11].
5 In conservative cases, e.g. Hamiltonian systems, D is the number of variables involved
in the dynamics; if the system is dissipative, D can be a fractional number and is smaller
than the dimension of the phase-space
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6 renders the approach described here useless, because it makes it practically
impossible to observe the ”same” state twice, i.e. within an acceptable accuracy
.
As already stressed in Section 2.2, the state of the system, i.e. the variables
which describe the phenomenon under investigation, is typically not known.
Therefore an unavoidable technical aspect is the determination of the proper
state of the system from the study of a time series {u1, u2, ..., uM}, where u is
an observable. The most relevant result for such a problem is due to Takens
who has been able to show that, at least from a mathematical point of view,
it is possible (if we know that the system is deterministic, described by a
finite dimensional vector, and M is arbitrarily large) to determine a proper
state-variable X. In a nutshell: there is a finite integer m such that the delay
coordinate vector (of dimension m)
y
(m)
k = (uk, uk−1, .., uk−m+1) (10)
can faithfully reconstruct the properties of the underlying dynamics6.
Of course the practical limitation due to the exponential increasing of TR
as a function of D, is present also in the Takens’s method; therefore we have
rather severe practical limitations [11]. Indeed, the conceptual idea behind all
these inductive approaches is always to try a reconstruction of the relevant
phase-space, which, at a resolution level , has roughly a volume of (L/)D. To
be explicit, and stress the limit of the method, consider a system ruled by a
deterministic law, for which the dimension of the attractor is D, and we know
a time series {u1, u2, ..., uM} of an observable; the method of Takens allows
to find (an approximation of ) the evolution law only if M is larger compared
with AD. The value of A depends on the wished accuracy; just to give an idea
let us assume A = 100, corresponding to just a fair accuracy, for D = 6, 7, and
8 we have AD = 1012, 1014 and 1016 respectively. Therefore also in the case we
know that the system is ruled by a deterministic law, such a knowledge does
not imply the actual possibility to perform an explicit compression.
5.3 Discussion
McAllister[35] has observed that empirical data sets are algorithmically in-
compressible, concluding that the task of scientific laws and theories does not
consist in compressing empirical data. We share such an opinion on the incom-
pressibility of generic empirical data, even though his argument is maybe too
sharp. As previously discussed in the context of chaotic deterministic systems
(e.g. the Bernoulli’s shift), the typical output is incompressible and, from a
mathematical point of view, such a result is a consequence of the important
result obtained by Martin-Lo¨f [26]: almost all the initial conditions correspond
to incompressible sequences.
6 A rigorous result states: m ≥ 2[D] + 1; from heuristic arguments on can expect that
m = [D] + 1 is enough [11].
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Regarding the opinion that scientific laws constitute a compression of em-
pirical data, McAllister claims that no scientist has ever made such a state-
ment. We do not enter into the historical aspects. However we want to dis-
cuss the following example: consider a series of light-refraction experiments,
in which {α1, ...., αN} are the angles of the incident rays, and {β1, ..., βN} the
angles of the refracted rays. The sequences {α1, ...., αN} and {β1, ..., βN} may
or may not be compressed. This is a frozen accident which depends on the pro-
tocol followed by the scientist while preparing the experiment, for instance, in
the case of the protocol αn+1 = αn + δ, the sequences can be compressed, on
the contrary if each αn is selected according to a random rule, the sequences
are not compressible. However, once the values {α1, ...., αN} are known, the
sequence {β1, ..., βN} is simply determined by the Snell’s law: sinα/ sinβ = n,
and this is a genuine form of compression. Therefore the example about the
Snell’s laws, which is often cited (likely because mentioned by Mach), is not
particularly deep.
A less trivial instance concerns the Navier-Stokes equation for fluids. We
saw how in such a chaotic systems, although the time sequences are not com-
pressible, the NSE have a predictive power, in the sense that they are able
to generate results in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with the
experiments.
The claim that the world is comprehensible because it is algorithmically
compressible is, in our opinion, a truism, which is equivalent to saying that
laws of nature exist. We note that the actual possibility to understand the
world arises mainly from a series of lucky facts, in particular:
• Typically physical laws obey spatially and temporally local rules, i.e. a given
phenomenon is not affected too much by events which are distant in time
and/or in space. Practically the main laws of physics, like the equations of
Maxwell, Schro¨dinger, Newton etc., obey the locality assumption and are de-
scribed by differential equations.
• Despite the enormous complexity and the intricate interconnections of dif-
ferent phenomena, often there is a scale separation which allows us for a de-
scription in terms of effective theories of the different levels on which reality
may be considered.
A celebrated example of an effective theory coming from the use of the separa-
tion of scales which characterises the microscopic, and the macroscopic realms,
is the Langevin equation describing the Brownian motion.
On the other hand, if the laws are not known and we have just the pos-
sibility to study time series, the scenario is quite pessimistic. If the effective
dimensionality is (relatively) large, even in the most simple case of determinis-
tic system, it is not possible to find the evolution laws and therefore to perform
an explicit compression [36]. Therefore the idea law = possibility of compres-
sion of data, must be (re)considered with many caveats. Perhaps we live in
a “big data” era, but actually not big enough to model complex phenomena,
without the help of some theory.
We stress again that disregarding the distinction between initial conditions
and laws of nature can lead to great confusion. In the Introduction we cited
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Davies[7] who claims that chaotic systems are not algorithmically compress-
ible. The discussion in Sect. 3 shows how chaotic systems can be trivially
compressible (in the sense that it is easy to write down the evolution laws, as,
e.g., for the Bernoulli’s shift or the NSE). What can be not compressible is
the output and this is related to the complexity of the sequence associated to
the initial condition.
McAllister after an analysis of the relevance of compressibility in science
concludes[35]:
In sum, a scientific law or theory provides an algorithmic compression not
of a data set in its entirety, as Mach, Solomonoff and others believed, but
only of a regularity that constitutes a component of the data set and that the
scientist picks out in the data. The remaining component of the data set, which
is algorithmically incompressible, is regarded as noise in the sense of classical
information theory.
We may agree with the previous sentence, if we keep our eyes open. To
be able to distinguish a regularity (the law) from underlying noise, a proper
resolution and, capitally, the separation of scale which permits to build coarse-
graining description are necessary. Moreover, in our opinion, for the under-
standing of any nontrivial topic it is too naive to hope in an approach based
on data and algorithms, and the study of the phenomenal framework is un-
avoidable[37].
Some remarks are in order. First, we would like to stress an issue which,
although rather important, is often not discussed. The relevance of the scale
resolution is closely linked with the proper effective variables which are able
to describe the phenomenon under investigation. Let us consider a fluid which
can be described, at microscopic level, in terms of its molecules; in such an ap-
proach the correct variables are the positions and momenta of the molecules. So
we have a very accurate description containing a lot of informations. However,
the microscopic level sometimes is not interesting. For instance in engineering
(or geophysical) problems it is much more relevant to adopt an hydrodynam-
ical description in terms of few fields (velocity, temperature and so on). Of
course using such a macroscopic description one has a huge decreasing of the
amount of information and an increasing of the possibility to compress data.
Then, few words on the qualitative aspects of science. Often qualitative
results are considered less important than the quantitative ones. That is an
unfair view, since although some results cannot be expressed in terms of nu-
merical sequences, they can be interesting and rigorous. For instance it can
be important to know that a phenomenon is periodic or some variables are
bounded in a certain domain. We can mention the Lotka-Volterra like equa-
tions, for which sometimes one can show that the time behaviour is periodic,
even though it is not possible to find the explicit solution. In a similar way, in
some celestial mechanics problems, it is enough to be sure that the motion (e.g.
of an asteroid) remains in a bounded region[11]. The previous qualitative re-
sults, although they cannot be formalized in terms of algorithmic compression
(which involves sequences) are genuine forms of compression of information.
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Finally, we would like to indicate an important example of a complex sys-
tem which has been understood rather successfully thanks to a traditional
theory/data approach: weather forecasting. This problem is related to the
dynamics of atmosphere which is characterized by (i) huge degrees of free-
dom;(ii) dynamical interaction with a complex environment; (iii) chaos and
many non-linear feedback mechanisms. Nevertheless, the modern develop-
ments of weather forecasting are based on the basic theory of such a system,
fluid mechanics as pioneered by Richardson [15,38]. In particular, the use of
the theory and the analysis of many phenomenological data have led to the
recognition of different separated scales, which has been key for the devel-
opment of a hierarchy of models adequate at different scales today solved by
numerical integration. Those models are statistical and mainly qualitative, but
rigorous to some extent thanks to the separation of scale. This example should
point out that the path to the understanding of complex phenomena is a bril-
liant interplay of deep empirical analysis, creative theoretical developments
and technical developments.
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A The algorithmic complexity in a nutshell
The rationalization of the idea of ”randomness” needs the introduction of a precise mathe-
matical formalisation of the complexity of a sequence.
This has been proposed independently in 1965 by Kolmogorov, Chaitin and Solomonoff,
and refined by Martin-Lo¨f[5,26].
Given the sequence a1, a2, ..., aN , among all possible programs which generate this se-
quence one considers with the smallest number of instructions. Denoting by K(N) the
number of these instructions, the algorithmic complexity of the sequence is defined by
K = lim
N→∞
K(N)
N
.
Therefore, if there is a simple rule that can be expressed by a few instructions, the complexity
vanishes. If there is no explicit rule, which is not just the complete list of 0 and 1, the
complexity is maximal, that is 1. Intermediate values of K between 0 and 1 correspond to
situations with no obvious rules, but such that part of the information necessary to do a
given step is contained in the previous steps.
To give an intuitive idea of the concept of complexity, let us consider a situation related
to the transmission of messages[39]: A friend on Mars needs the tables of logarithms. It is
easy to send him the tables in binary language; this method is safe but would naturally be
very expensive. It is cheaper to send the instructions necessary to implement the algorithm
which computes logarithms: it is enough to specify few simple properties, e.g.
ln(a b) = ln(a) + ln(b) , ln(aαbβ) = α ln(a) + β ln(b) ,
and, in addition, for |x| < 1 the following Taylor expansion:
ln(1 + x) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 x
n
n
.
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However, if the friend is not interested in mathematics, but rather in football or the lottery,
and wants to be informed of the results of football matches or lottery draw, there is no way
of compressing the information in terms of an algorithm whose repeated use produces the
relevant information for the different events; the only option is the transmission of the entire
information. To sum up: the cost of the transmission of the information contained in the
algorithm of logarithms is independent of the number of logarithms one wishes to compute.
On the contrary, the cost of the transmission of football or lottery results increases linearly
with the number of events. One might think that the difference is that there are precise
mathematical rules for logarithms, but not for football matches and lottery drawings, which
are then classified as random events.
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